In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a few other agents in the past. In this paper we analyze a broad class of such social learning processes, and study under what circumstances they are path-dependent. Our main result shows that a population converges to the same behavior independently of the initial state, provided that the expected number of actions observed by each agent is less than one. Moreover, in any environment in which the expected number of observed actions is more than one, there is a learning rule for which the initial state has a lasting impact on future behavior.
Introduction
Agents must often make decisions without knowing the cost and benefits of the possible choices. In such situations an inexperienced (or "newborn") agent may learn from the experience of others, by basing his decision, on observations of a few actions taken by other agents in the past (see, e.g., the social learning models of Ellison & Fudenberg, 1993 Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2011) . In other environments, agents interact with random opponents, and an agent may base his choice of action on a few observations of how his current opponent behaved in the past (as first described in Rosenthal, 1979, and further developed and applied to various models of community enforcement in the Prisoner's Dilemma game in (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Takahashi, 2010; Heller & Mohlin, 2017)) .
In this paper we analyze a broad class of social learning processes, and study under what circumstances they are path-dependent. Specifically, we ask whether the initial behavior of the population has a lasting influence on the population's behavior in the long run. Our main result shows that, if the expected number of actions that each revising agent observes is less than one, then the population converges to the same behavior independently of the initial state. Moreover, if the expected number of observed actions is more than one, then there is a rule according to which agents learn from the experience of others, such that if the agents follow this learning rule, then the environment admits multiple steady states, and the initial state determines which steady states will prevail.
Overview of the Model
We consider an infinite population of agents. Time is discrete and in every period each agent is faced with a choice among a fixed set of alternatives. Each agent in the population is endowed with a type. The population state is a vector describing the aggregate distribution of actions played by agents of each type. In each period a share 0 < β ≤ 1 of the agents are randomly selected to reevaluate their choice, while the remaining agents play the same action as they played in the past. The revising agents can also be interpreted as "newborn" agents that join the population. Each revising agent observes a finite sequence of actions (called a sample) of random size. The sample may consists of either past actions of random agents in the population (as in the social learning models mentioned above) or past actions of the current random opponent (as in the community enforcement models mentioned above). An environment is a tuple that specifies all the above components.
A profile of learning rules assigns to each type in the population a rule that determines the distribution of actions played by a revising agent as a function of the observed sample. The environment and the profile of learning rules jointly induce a mapping between population states that determines a new population state for each initial state. A population state is steady state if it is a fixed point of this mapping.
Main Results
Our main result (Theorem 2) fully characterizes which environments admit learning rules with multiple steady states. Specifically, it shows that an environment admits a learning rule with more than one multiple steady state if and only if the mean sample size is strictly more than one (or if agents always observe a single action). In the opposite case, each profile of learning rules admits a unique steady state, and, moreover, the population converges to the unique steady state from any initial state. The "only if" side relies on showing that the mapping between states is a contraction mapping whenever the mean sample size is less than one. The "if" side relies on constructing a specific learning rule, according to which agents play action a if they observe action a in their sample, and play action a otherwise. One can show that such a learning rule always admits two different steady states provided that the expected number of observed actions is larger than one.
Extensions We extend our model to deal with non-stationary environments, in which the distribution of sample sizes and the agents' learning rules depend on calendar time, and we characterize when a non-stationary environment admits a unique sequence of states, such that it converges to this sequence of states from any initial population state. We further extend the model to time-dependent common stochastic shocks that influence the learning rules of all agents, and we characterize when the initial population state may have a lasting effect in such environments.
Our results so far have not assumed anything about the agents' learning rules. Obviously, additional information on the learning rules, may allow us to achieve stronger results. Next, we present a simple notion that measures how responsive a learning rule is to different samples, and we use this notion to define the effective sample size of a learning process (which is always weakly smaller than the simple mean sample size).
Finally, we apply the notion of effective sample size to derive a tighter upper bound for learning processes that admit unique steady states.
Related Literature Various papers have studied different aspects of the question of when social learning is path dependent. Most of this literature focuses on specific learning rules, according to which revising agents myopically best reply to the empirical frequency of the observed actions. Arthur (1989) (see related models and extensions in Arthur, 1994; Kaniovski & Young, 1995) studies games in which agents sequentially choose which competing technology to adopt, and he shows that social learning is path dependent if the technologies have increasing returns. Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993a) study models of finite large populations who are involved in a social learning process, and revising agents occasionally make mistakes (e.g., an agent adopts a technology that is not his myopic best reply to his sampled information). They show that the path dependency of the social learning process vanishes when infinite time horizons are considered. In many cases, when the probability of mistakes is sufficiently small the population spends almost all the time in a unique "stochastically stable state", which is independent of the initial state. A key difference between our model and their models is that we model an infinite population, rather than a large finite population. In Section 8, we discuss the relations between the present paper and the literature on stochastic stability, and the interpretation of our results for finite large populations. Sandholm (2001) shows that when each revising agent observes k actions and the game admits a 1 k -dominant action a * (i.e., action a * is the unique best reply against any mixed strategy assigning mass of at least 1 k to a * ), then the social learning converges to this action regardless of the initial state. Recently, Oyama et al. (2015) substantially strengthens this result by extending it to iterated p-dominant actions, and by showing that the global convergence is fast.
Our model differs from all the above-mentioned literature in that we study general environments and arbitrary learning rules (rather than focusing on a specific learning rule, such as myopic best replying). Moreover, we ask what properties of the agents' sampling procedures imply that any learning rule admits a unique steady state and global convergence to this state.
Structure
We present motivating examples in Section 2. The basic model is described in Section 3. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 generalizes the basic model to deal with heterogeneous populations.
In Section 6 we extend the analysis to non-stationary learning processes and to common shocks. In Section 7 we define the responsiveness of a learning rule, and use it to achieve a stronger sufficient condition for an environment to admit a unique steady state. We conclude in Section 8. Technical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Motivating Examples
In this section we present three motivating examples, which will be revisited further below to demonstrate the applicability of our model and the implications of our results.
Example 1 (Competing Technologies). Consider a population in which in each period a share of β ∈ (0, 1) of the incumbent agents die, and are replaced with new agents. A population state describes the share of agents who use each of two competing agricultural technologies, a 1 and a 2 . Each new agent observes the action of a single random incumbent, and receives a noisy signal about the expected payoff of the two competing technologies. Following these observations the agent chooses one of the technologies. Assume that the learning rules used by the agents imply that each new agent plays (on average) action a 1 with a probability ofᾱ ∈ [0, 1] after observing action a 1 , and with a probability of α ∈ [0, 1] after observing action 1 a 2 . One can show that:
1. ifᾱ = 1 and α = 0, then any population state is a steady state of the environment, and 2. otherwise, the population converges from any initial population state to a unique steady state in which a share α 1+α−ᾱ of the agents play action a 1 .
The second example is a simple variant of various models of indirect reciprocity and "image scoring" (see, e.g., (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Takahashi, 2010; Heller & Mohlin, 2017) ).
Example 2 (Indirect Reciprocity). Consider a population in which in each period each agent is randomly matched with three opponents, and plays a Prisoner's Dilemma with each of them. In each match (within the same period) the agent observes, with a probability of p ∈ (0, 1), one action played in the previous round by his current opponents. We consider two different cases of what happens with the remaining probability of 1 − p. Case I: The agent observes no actions, and in this case the agent cooperates with probability α.
Case II: The agent observes the three actions played in the previous round by his current opponents. If an agent observes past actions of opponents, then the agent plays the modal action of the opponent (i.e., the agent defects when the unique observed action is defection, or when at least 2 out of the 3 observed actions are defections). Under these conditions one can show the following. Case I: the population converges from any initial population state to a unique steady state in which each agent defects with an average probability of α. Case II: If, initially, the average probability of cooperation was above (below) 50%, then the population converges to a steady state in which all agents always cooperate (defect).
Example 3 (Rock-Paper-Scissors). Consider a population in which each agent is matched with a random opponent to play the rock-paper-scissors game. Each player has three pure actions (rock, paper, scissors) , and each action is the unique best reply to the previous action (modulo 3). 2 In the initial round t = 1 the aggregate distributions of actions is α 0 ∈ ∆ (rock, paper, scissors). In each later round, a share p ∈ [0, 1] of the population observes the opponent's action in the previous round, and best-replies to it. The remaining share 1 − p of the agents observe no actions, and plays the mixed actionα.
If p = 1 it is immediate that the population's behavior cycles "around" permutations of the initial behavior (as is common in evolutionary models of rock-paper-scissors; see, e.g., the analysis in Cason et al. 2014) . Formally, let t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}:
1. In round 3 · t + 1 agents play rock with a probability of α 0 (rock), paper with a probability of α 0 (paper),
and scissors with a probability of α 0 (scissors).
2. In round 3·t+2 agents play rock with a probability of α 0 (scissors), paper with a probability of α 0 (rock),
and scissors with a probability of α 0 (paper).
3. In round 3·t+3 agents play rock with a probability of α 0 (paper), paper with a probability of α 0 (scissors),
and scissors with a probability of α 0 (rock).
However, when p < 1, one can show that the population converges to the following unique behavior (regardless of the initial behavior α 0 ):
of the fraction of users. Stationarity means that signal distributions are constant over time so that choice probabilities do not need to depend on calendar time. The fact that profitability is independent of the fraction of users means that signal distributions do not change as the population state changes, and hence there is no need to condition choice on anything other than the observed action.
2 Observe that the analysis depends only on the ordinal best-reply correspondence over pure actions, and is independent of the cardinal payoffs.
Note that when p is close to one, the unique behavior is close to the uniform mixed profile that assigns a probability of 1 3 to each action. 
Basic Model
Throughout the paper we restrict attention to distributions with a finite support. Given a (possibly infinite) set X, let ∆ (X) denote the set of distributions over this set that have a finite support. With a slight abuse of notation we use x ∈ X to denote the degenerate distribution µ ∈ ∆ (X) that assigns probability one to x (i.e., we write µ ≡ x if µ (x) = 1).
Population state.
Consider an infinite population of agents. 4 More precisely, the population consists of continuum of agents with mass one. Time is discrete and in every period (or "round") each agent is faced with a choice among a fixed set of alternatives A. Let A be an ordered finite set of at least two actions (i.e.,
|A| ≥ 2).
The population state (or state for short) is identified with the aggregate distribution of actions played in the population, denoted γ ∈ ∆ (A). Let Γ denote the set of all population states.
Revising agents. At each period, a share of 0 < β ≤ 1 of the agents are randomly selected to reevaluate their choice, while the remaining 1 − β share of the agents play the same action as they played in the past. The case of β = 1 describes a population in which each agent reevaluates his action in every period. The case of β ∈ (0, 1) may be interpreted as describing a fixed population, in which each agent reevaluates his action only once every 1 β period, due to inertia (see, e.g., Ellison & Fudenberg, 1995) . Alternatively it may be interpreted as describing a situation where, in each period, a share of β of the agents exit the population and are replaced with new agents (see, e.g., Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004) . Each new agent chooses an action based on a sample of a few actions of incumbents. The agent, then keeps playing this chosen action throughout his active life, possibly because the initial choice requires a substantial action-specific investment, and it is too costly for an agent to reinvest in a different action later on.
Sample. Each revising agent observes a finite sequence of actions (or sample). The size of the observed sample is a random variable ν ∈ ∆ (N), where ∆ (N) denotes the set of finite support distributions over the natural numbers (including zero). Let M denote the set of all feasible samples, i.e.,
where A 0 = {∅} is a singleton consisting of the empty sample ∅. Letl = max (supp (ν)) < ∞ be the maximal sample size. Note that M is finite in virtue of the finite-support assumption. For each sample size l ∈ N, let We assume that each agent independently samples different agents, and observes a random action played by each of these agents. This kind of sampling is common in models of social learning (see, e.g., Ellison & Fudenberg, 1995; Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004) . Formally, we define for each sample size l ∈ N, each state γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a 1 , ..., a l ),
Environment. An environment is a tuple
that includes the three components described above: a finite set of actions A, a fraction of revising agents at each stage β, and a distribution of sample sizes ν.
Given environment E = (A, β, ν), let µ l denote the mean sample size, i.e., the expected number of actions observed by a random agent in the population. Formally:
Learning rule and stationary learning process. Each revising agent chooses his action in the new population state by following a stationary (i.e., time-independent) learning rule σ : M → ∆ (A). That is, a revising agent who observes sample m ∈ M plays action a with probability σ m (a) . The remaining 1 − β non-revising agents play the same action as in the previous round.
A stationary learning process (or learning process for short) is a pair
consisting of an environment and a learning rule.
Population dynamics.
An initial state and a learning process uniquely determine a new state. To see this note that since the number of messages M , and actions A are finite, whereas the population is infinite, the probability that an agent observes a message m and switches to an action a is equal to the fraction of agents who observe a message m and switch to an action a. For this reason we say that the learning process is deterministic, despite the fact that the choice of an individual agent may be stochastic.
Let f P : Γ → Γ denote the mapping between states induced by a single step of the learning process P .
That is, f P (γ) is the new state induced by a single step of the process P , given an initial stateγ. Similarly, for each t > 1, let f t P (γ) denote the state induced after t steps of the learning process P , given an initial statê γ (e.g., f
We say that γ * is a steady state with respect to the stationary learning process P , if it is a fixed point of
Steady state γ * is a global attractor, if the population converges to γ * from any initial state, i.e., if
L 1 -distance. We measure distances between probability distributions with the L 1 -distance (norm). Specifically, let the L 1 -distance between two distributions of samples ψ l,γ , ψ l,γ ∈ ∆ A l of size l, be defined as follows:
Similarly the L 1 -distance between two distributions of actions γ, γ ∈ ∆ (A) is defined as follows:
We conclude this section by demonstrating how the model captures motivating Examples 1-2.
Example 1 (Competing Technologies revisited). The environment in which agents learn which of two competing technologies to use is modeled by a learning process
in which A = {a 1 , a 2 } is the set of competing technologies, β ∈ (0, 1) is the share of new agents that join the population in each round (replacing incumbent agents who have died). Finally, let the learning rule σ be defined as follows:
Example 2 (Indirect Reciprocity revisited). The environment in which agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma and use rules representing indirect reciprocity is modeled by a learning process
in which A = {c, d} is the set of actions in the Prisoner's Dilemma, all agents revise their actions in each round. Recall that in this environment each agent is matched with three different random opponents in each round. For each such match, the agent observes a sample m of the opponent's actions in the previous round, and uses the the following learning rule σ to choose his action:
Let ν be defined as follows: ν (1) = p, and ν (0) = 1 − p in Case I, while ν (3) = 1 − p in Case II. Observe that the expected number of actions is smaller than one in Case I (µ l = p), and larger than one in Case
Main Results

Upper Bound on the Distance between New States
Our first result shows that the distance between two new states is at most (1 − β · (1 − µ l )) times the distance between the two initial states. Formally, Theorem 1. Let P = (A, β, ν, σ) be a stationary learning process, and let γ = γ ∈ Γ be two population states.
Then:
with a strict inequality if there exists an l > 1 such that ν (l) > 0.
(Sketch of proof. Formal proof is presented for the more general result of Theorem 3.)
The distance between the final population states is bounded as follows:
The intuition of this inequality is as follows. The first part of the RHS of Eq. (2) Next, observe that the distance between distributions of samples is bounded by the sample size times the distance between the distributions of actions:
with a strict inequality if l > 1. Substituting the second inequality in (2) yields:
Observe
Theorem 1 implies that f P is a weak contraction mapping if either it holds that µ l < 1, or it holds that µ l = 1 and 5 ν (1) < 1. The fact that the mapping f P is a weak contraction mapping implies that f p admits a global attractor. 
Full Characterization of Environments that Admit Multiple Steady States
Our main result fully characterizes which environments admit learning rules for which the past casts a long
shadow. Specifically, it shows that an environment admits a learning rule with more than one multiple steady state iff µ > 1 (alternatively if all agents sample exactly one action). In the opposite case (µ ≤ 1) each learning rule admits a unique steady state, and, moreover, the population converges to the unique steady state from any initial state. Formally:
The following two conditions are equivalent:
There exists a learning rule σ, such that the learning process (E, σ) admits two different steady states.
Proof. Corollary 1 immediately implies that ¬1⇒¬2. We are left with the task of showing that 1 ⇒ 2.
Case A: Assume that ν (1) = 1 (i.e., each revising agent in the population observes a single action).
Consider the learning rule in which each agent plays the action that he observed, i.e., σ * (a) = a. Let γ be an arbitrary population state. Observe that γ is a steady state of the learning process (E, σ * ) because:
Case B: Assume that µ l > 1. Let a and a be different actions (a = a ∈ A). Let σ * be a learning rule according to which each agent plays action a * if he has observed action a * at least once, and plays action a otherwise, that is,
It is immediate that the population state in which all agents play action a (i.e., γ (a ) = 1 ) is a steady state of the learning process (E, σ * ). We now show that there exists x > 0, such that the population state γ x in which all agents play action a * with probability x, and play action a with the remaining probability of 1 − x (i.e., γ x (a * ) = x and γ x (a ) = 1 − x) is another steady state of the learning process (E, σ * ). Observe that the state γ x is consistent with the learning process (E, σ * ) if and only if
In order to demonstrate the existence of multiple steady states we need to show that there is x * such that g (x * ) = x * . Observe that g (x) (defined in (3) above) is a continuous increasing function of x, and that g (1) ≤ 1. Below we show that g (x) > x for x << 1, which implies by standard a continuity argument that there is 0 < x * ≤ 1 such that g (x * ) = x * , and hence γ x * is a steady state of the learning process (E, σ * ).
We conclude the proof by showing that g (x) > x for x << 1. Observe that when x << 1 is close to 0, then
This implies that when x << 1, (f P (γ x )) (a * ) can be approximated by:
Heterogeneous Population
The basic model assumes that all agents share the same distribution of sample sizes, and the same learning rule. In many applications the population might be heterogeneous, i.e., the population includes various groups that differ in their sampling procedures and learning rules. A few examples for such models with heterogeneous populations are:
1. Ellison & Fudenberg (1993) studies competing technologies where each technology is better for some of the players and these different taste induce different learning rules (see also Munshi, 2004) .
2. Young (1993b) studies social learning in a bargaining model in which agents differ in the size of their samples.
3. In a companion paper (Heller & Mohlin, 2017) analyses community enforcement in which the population includes several types of agents, and each type uses a different strategy.
Extended Model
In what follows we introduce heterogeneous populations that include different types, and we redefine the notions of population state, environment and learning process to deal with this heterogeneity in the sampling sizes and learning rules.
Population state. Let Θ denote a finite set of types with a typical element θ. Let λ θ denote the mass of agents of type θ (or θ-agents). For simplicity, we assume that λ has full support. We redefine a population state (or state for short) to be a vector γ = (γ θ ) θ∈Θ , where each γ θ ∈ ∆ (A) denotes the aggregate distribution of actions played by θ-agents. Letγ ∈ ∆ (A) denote the average distribution of actions in the population (i.e.,γ (a) = θ λ θ γ θ (a) for each action a ∈ A). A population state is uniform if all the types play the same aggregate distribution of actions, i.e., if γ θ (a) =γ (a) for each type θ ∈ Θ and action a ∈ A. We redefine Γ to denote the set of all population with heterogeneous types.
Revising agents. As in the basic model, in each period, a share of 0 < β ≤ 1 of the agents are randomly selected to reevaluate their choice (i.e., a mass of β · λ θ of θ-agents for each θ ∈ Θ), while the remaining 1 − β share of the agents play the same action as they played in the past.
Sample. Each revising agent observes a finite sequence of actions (or sample). The size of the sample observed by type θ is a random variable ν θ ∈ ∆ (N), where ∆ (N) denotes the set of finite support distributions over the natural numbers (including zero). Let M , the set of all feasible samples, be redefined as follows We analyze two kinds of sampling methods in heterogeneous populations:
1. Observing different random agents: Each agent independently samples different agents, and observes a random action played by each of these agents. This kind of sampling is a common modeling choice in situations in which an agent's payoff depends not on the behavior of a specific sub-group of opponents, but on the agent's own action, the state of nature, and, possibly, the aggregate behavior of the population (see, e.g., Ellison & Fudenberg, 1995; Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004) . Formally, we define for each sample size l ∈ N, each state γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a 1 , ..., a l ),
2. Observing a single random type: Each agent randomly draws a typeθ, and then the agent samples different agents of typeθ, and observes a random action played by each of theseθ-agents. This kind of observation is relevant to models in which the agent is randomly matched with an opponent, and may sample some actions played in the past by agents with the same type as the opponent. Formally, we define for each size l ∈ N, each state γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a 1 , ..., a l ),
In the case of β = 1, this sampling method has another interpretation that is common in models of strategic interactions among randomly matched agents (e.g., (Rosenthal, 1979; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Heller & Mohlin, 2017) ). According to this interpretation, each agent is involved in n ≥l interactions in each period. In each of these interactions the agent is randomly matched with a different opponent, and the agent observes a sample of random actions played by the opponent in the previous round.
Observe that both cases, i.e., (4) and (5), coincide in two special cases: (1) when the population state is uniform (as in the basic model), or (2) when agents observe at most one action (i.e.,l = 1).
Remark 1. All our results work also in a setup in which some types use the first sampling method (i.e., observing different random agents), while other types use the second sampling method (i.e., observing a single random type).
Environment.
We redefine an environment as a tuple
that includes the six components described above: a finite set of actions A, a finite set of types Θ, a fraction of revising agents at each stage β, a sampling rule ψ l (satisfying either (4) or (5)), a distribution over the set of types λ, and a profile of distributions of sample sizes (ν θ ) θ∈Θ .
Given environment E = A, Θ, β, ψ l , (λ θ , ν θ ) θ∈Θ , let µ l , the mean sample size, be redefined as the expected number of actions observed by a random agent in the population. Formally:
Learning rule and stationary learning process. Each revising θ-agent chooses his action in the new
population state by following a stationary (i.e., time-independent) learning rule σ θ : M → ∆ (A). That is, a revising θ-agent who observes sample m ∈ M plays action a with probability σ θ,m (a) . The remaining 1 − β non-revising agents play the same action as in the previous round. A profile of learning rules (σ θ ) θ∈Θ is uniform if all types use the same learning rule, i.e., if σ θ = σ θ for each type θ, θ ∈ Θ.
As in the basic model, let f P : Γ → Γ denote the mapping between states induced by a single step of the learning process P .
We define the distance between two population states γ, γ ∈ Γ as the L 1 -distance between the corresponding distributions q γ , q γ; ∈ (Θ × A):
We demonstrate how the extended model captures motivating Example 3, in which there are two types that differ in their sample sizes.
Example 3 (Rock-Paper-Scissors revisited) The environment in which agents play the rock-paper-scissors game is modeled by a learning process
where Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 } is the set of types, all agents revise their actions in each period, ψ l is determined by Eq. (5) representing an observation of a single random type. The mass of type θ 1 is p (i.e., λ θ1 = p and λ θ2 = 1 − p), θ 1 -agents always observe a single action (ν θ1 ≡ 1), and θ 2 -agents always observe no actions (ν θ2 ≡ 0). Finally, let the learning rules be defined as follows:
Observe that the expected number of actions is equal to p (i.e., µ l = p).
Generalizing the Main Results for Heterogeneous Populations
Our next result generalizes Theorem 1 to heterogeneous populations. It shows that the distance between two new states is at most (1 − β · (1 − µ l )) times the distance between the two initial states. Formally,
Theorem 3. (Generalization of Theorem 1) Let
process, and let γ = γ ∈ Γ be two population states. Then:
with a strict inequality if there exist a type θ and an
The intuition is similar to Theorem 1. The proof is presented in the Appendix A.
Similar to Section 4, Theorem 1 implies that f P admits a global attractor if either (1) µ l < 1, or (2) µ l = 1 and there is a type θ ∈ Θ such that ν θ (1) < 1. Formally: 
The following result generalizes Theorem 2 to the setup of heterogeneous populations. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2 and is omitted for brevity.
Theorem 4. (Generalization of Theorem 2) Let
following two conditions are equivalent:
2. There exists a profile of learning rules (σ θ ) θ∈Θ , such that the learning process E, (σ θ ) θ∈Θ admits two different steady states.
Non-Stationary Learning Process and Common Shocks
The Non-Stationary Process
In this section we adapt the model of Section 5 to deal with non-stationary deterministic learning processes, in which the process explicitly depends on calendar time. We extend our results to this setup.
Adaptations to the model. For each period t ∈ N, let β t ∈ [0, 1] denote the random share of agents who revise their actions in period t. For each type θ ∈ Θ and period t ∈ N, let ν t θ ∈ ∆ (N) denote the distribution of sample sizes of type θ in period t. To simplify the notation we assume that the support of the sample sizes of each type is independent of the period, i.e., supp ν t1 θ = supp ν t2 θ := supp (ν θ ) for each type θ ∈ Θ and periods t 1 , t 2 ∈ N. As in the basic model, let M denote the set of all feasible sample sizes. A non-stationary environment is a tuple
Given a non-stationary environment, let µ t l denote the expected number of actions observed in period t, i.e., µ
Given a non-stationary environment E, letμ l be the upper limit of the geometric mean of 1 − β t · (1 − µ t l ) as t goes to to infinity, i.e.,μ
For each type θ ∈ Θ and period t ∈ N, let σ t θ : M → ∆ (A) denote the non-stationary learning rule of revising θ-agents in period t. A non-stationary learning process is a pair consisting of a non-stationary environment and a non-stationary learning rule, i.e.,
As as in the basic model, a non-stationary learning process P and an initial state uniquely determine a new state in each period t. Let f t p (γ) ∈ Γ denote the state induced after t stages of the non-stationary learning process P .
A sequence of states (γ * t ) t∈N is a global attractor of the non-stationary learning process P , if
Adapted results. Minor adaptations to the proof of Theorem 3 and a simple inductive argument immediately imply that the distance between two states at time t o is at most t≤t0 (1 − β t · (1 − µ t l )) the initial distance. Formally:
θ∈Θ,t∈N be a non-stationary learning process, let γ,γ ∈ Γ be two population states, and lett ∈ N. Then:
This, in turn, immediately implies that in any non-stationary environment in whichμ l < 1, any profile of non-stationary learning rules admits a global attractor. Formally: The example presented in Case A of the proof of Theorem 2 demonstrates that the above bound ofμ l < 1 is binding in the sense that there is an environment withμ l = 1 that admits a profile of learning rules with multiple steady states.
Process with Common Shocks
In this section we further extend our model to deal also with common stochastic shocks to the learning rules, and we extend our results to this setup.
Additional adaptations to the model.
In what follows we further adapt the model of Section 6.1 by allowing common stochastic shocks to the learning rules of the agents.
Let (Ω, F, p) be an arbitrary probability space. Each element ω ∈ Ω represents the state of nature, which determines the realizations of all common shocks to the learning rules in all periods. For each type θ ∈ Θ and period t ∈ N, let σ t θ : Ω × M → ∆ (A) denote the state-dependent learning rule of revising θ-agents in period t (which also depends on the state of nature). A learning process with common shocks is a pair consisting of a non-stationary environment and a state-dependent learning rule, i.e., The state of nature, the learning process, and the initial population state uniquely determine the population state in each period. Let f t p (ω) (γ) ∈ Γ denote the population state induced after t stages of the non-stationary learning process P , given an initial population stateγ, and state of nature ω ∈ Ω.
We say that a sequence of state-dependent population states (γ * t ) t∈N , where γ * t : Ω → Γ, is a state-dependent global attractor of the learning process with commons shocks P if, for each ω ∈ Ω, lim t−→∞ f t P (ω) (γ) = γ * t (ω) for each initial stateγ ∈ Γ.
Example 4 below demonstrates how to apply the extended model to a social learning process with competing technologies with common shocks:
Example 4 (Competing Technologies with Common Shocks). Consider a stochastic environment in which there are two possible regimes {1, 2}. There are two technologies: a 1 and a 2 . Technology a 1 is advantageous in regime 1, while technology a 2 is advantageous in regime 2. In round 1 the regime is uniformly distributed.
In each subsequent round, the regime is the same as in the previous round with probability 99%, and it is a new regime with probability 1%. In each round, a share of 25% of the incumbents die, and are replaced with new agents. Each new agent observes the action of a single random incumbent and a noisy signal about the current regime, and based on these observations, the agent chooses one of the two technologies. Assume that the learning rule used by the agents implies that each new agent plays action a 1 :
1. with a probability of 95% after observing action a 1 in regime 1; 2. with a probability of 80% after observing action a 1 in regime 2; 3. with a probability of 20% after observing action a 2 in regime 1; 4. with a probability of 5% after observing action a 2 in regime 2.
One can show that the environment admits a unique steady state that is a state-dependent global attractor.
The induced aggregate behavior of the population converges towards playing action a 1 with an average probability of 80% in regime 1, and it converges towards playing action a 1 with an average probability of 20% in regime 2.
This learning process with common shocks is modeled as
The set of states of nature Ω = (ω n ) n∈N is the set of infinite binary sequences, where each ω n ∈ {1, 2} describes the regime in round n. The definition of (F, p) is derived from the Markovian process determining the regime in each round in a standard way. Given state ω = (ω n ) n∈N , let the learning rule be defined as follows:
95% a = a 1 and ω t = 1 80% a = a 1 and ω t = 2 20% a = a 2 and ω t = 1 5% a = a 2 and ω t = 2.
Adapted Results. Minor adaptations to the proof of Theorem 3 and a simple inductive argument immediately imply that the distance between two states at timet is at most t≤t (1 − β t · (1 − µ t l )) the initial distance. Formally:
θ∈Θ,t∈N be a learning process with commons shocks, letγ,γ ∈ Γ be two population states, and lett ∈ N. Then, for each ω ∈ Ω,
An immediate corollary of Corollary 5 is that any environment with common shocks in whichμ l < 1, given any profile of learning rules, admits a stochastic global attractor. That is, in the long run, the population's behavior depends only on the state of nature, but it is independent of the initial population state in time zero.
Formally: 
Responsiveness and Effective Sample Size
Our results so far have not assumed anything about the agents' learning rules. Obviously, additional information on the profile of learning rules, may allow us to achieve stronger results. In this section, we present simple notions of responsiveness and expected effective sample size, and use them to derive a tighter upper bound for processes that admit global attractors.
Additional Definitions
Fix a stationary learning process P = A, Θ, β, ψ l , (λ θ , ν θ , σ θ ) θ∈Θ . For each type θ, each sample size l ∈ supp (ν), and each action a ∈ A , let σ θ,l (a) (σ θ,l (a)) be the minimal (maximal) probability that learning rule σ assigns to action a after observing a sample of size l, i.e.,
Let r θ,l denote the maximal responsiveness of revising θ-agents to changes in observed samples of size l, which is defined as follows:
and let r θ,0 = 0. The responsiveness effectively limits the maximal influence of different samples of length l on the behavior of θ-agents to be at most r θ,l ≤ 1. Observe that when there are two actions (i.e., A = {a, b}), then r θ,l is simply the difference between the maximal and minimal probability assigned to each action, i.e.,
When there are more than two actions,
a) may be larger than one. We bound r θ,l from above by one in Eq.(6) because, any change of sample cannot affect an agent's mixed behavior by more than one (as measured by the L 1 -distance over the set of mixed actions).
We call the product of the sample size and the responsiveness, r θ,l · l the effective sample size. For each type θ, let µ e θ ∈ R + denote the expected effective sample size of θ-agents, i.e.,
Finally, let µ ∈ R + denote the effective sample size in the population, i.e.,
It is immediate that the effective sample size is always weakly smaller than the expected sample size in the population; i.e., µ e l ≤ µ l for each stationary learning process
A Tighter Bound on the Distance between New States
Our main result in this section shows that the distance between two new states is at most (1 − β · (1 − µ e l )) times the distance between the two initial states. This bound is tighter than the one presented in Theorem 1, as we replace expected sample size µ l with the (weakly) smaller effective sample size µ e l . Formally, Theorem 5. Let P = A, Θ, β, ψ l , (λ θ , ν θ , σ θ ) θ∈Θ be a stationary learning process, and let γ = γ ∈ Γ be two population states. Then:
where the inequality is strict if there exist a type θ and an l > 1 such that ν θ (l) > 0.
Proof. The key step of the proof is to show the following inequality:
Inequality (8) is the same as (2) in the proof of Theorem 1, except for the factor of r θ,l ≤ 1 on the RHS. All other arguments of the proof of Theorem 1 remain the same. We prove (8) in Lemma 6 in Appendix B.
Observe that (1 − β · (1 − µ e l )) < 1 iff µ e l < 1, and in this case f P is a contraction mapping, which implies that f P admits a global attractor. This allows us to strengthen Corollary 1 as follows. 
Corollary 7. Let
which is strictly less than one if α < 1 or α > 0. Corollary 7 implies that the learning process converges to a global attractor (which is the unique steady state) whenever α < 1 or α > 0.
Our final result shows that given any environment in which the expected sample size µ l > 1, and any number 1 < y ≤ µ l , there is a learning rule with an effective sample size of µ e l = y with multiple steady states. Formally: 
Observe that the responsiveness of E, (σ * θ ) θ∈Θ is equal to x because:
It is immediate that the uniform population state in which all agents play action a (i.e., γ θ (a ) = 1 for each type θ ∈ Θ) is a steady state of the learning process E, (σ * θ ) θ∈Θ . An analogous argument to the one presented in Case B of the proof of Theorem 2 shows that there exists x > 0 such that the uniform population state γ x in which all agents play action a * with probability x, and play action a with the remaining probability of 1 − x, is another steady state of the learning process E, (σ * θ ) θ∈Θ .
Concluding Remarks
Repeated Interactions without Calendar Time. In many real-life situations agents are randomly matched within a community, and these interactions have been going on since time immemorial. Modelling such situations as repeated games with a definite starting point and strategies that can be conditioned on calendar time may be a problematic modelling choice, as it seems implausible that agents would be aware of the the exact time that has transpired since the starting point, and aware of the very distant history of play of other agents. An alternative approach, is to model behavior in such situations as steady states of environments without a calendar time (see, e.g., (Rosenthal, 1979; Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1995; Phelan & Skrzypacz, 2006; Heller & Mohlin, 2017) , and the working paper version of Phelan & Skrzypacz, 2006 ).
An interesting question about such environments is whether the distribution of strategies used by the players to choose their actions as a function of their observations is sufficient to uniquely determine the steady states, or whether the same distribution of rules may admit multiple steady states. Our main result shows that the former is true whenever the expected number of observed actions is less than one, while if the expected number of observed actions is more than one, then there is always a distribution of rules with multiple steady states. If the finite population is sufficiently large then we expect the resulting stochastic process to be close to the deterministic process over finite time horizons. However, when time goes to infinity, rare random events will occasionally take the population away from one (locally stable) steady state towards another steady state.
Multiple
8
When dealing with finite large populations, one should therefore interpret our main result (Theorem 2) as follows. In environments in which µ l < 1, all learning processes admit a unique globally stable state γ * . The population will quickly converge to state γ * , and will almost always remain very close to this state. A rare event in which the realized observations of many agents substantially differ from their expected values, may take the population temporarily away from γ * , but with a very high probability the population will quickly converge back to γ * .
In environments in which µ l > 1, there are learning rules that admit multiple steady states. The fact that the population is finite and that the new population state is a random variable will typically quickly take the population away from steady states that are not locally stable. If the environment admits multiple locally stable steady states, then the initial state will determine which of these locally stable states the population will converge to in the medium run. Moreover the process will likely stay there for a significant amount of time.
The literature on stochastic evolutionary game theory (starting with the pioneering works of Foster & Young, 1990; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993a; see Young, 2015 , for a recent survey) studies situations the long-run behavior in environments with multiple locally stable steady states, and in which there is a small level of noise in the agents' behavior. We think that it would be interesting to extend the methodology of this literature in order to apply it to the setup analyzed in this paper. It might be that such future research can characterize various cases in which, if the population size is sufficiently large, in the long run the population will spend almost all of the time in one of these locally stable states.
Observations of Action Profiles. In Heller & Mohlin (2017) we investigate environments in which an agent may observe action profiles played in past interactions between his current opponent and her past opponents.
All of our results can be extended to this setup, with relatively minor adjustments to the proofs. Specifically one should count an observation of an action profile (in a two-player game) as two actions when calculating the expected number of observed actions µ l . Our main result still holds in this setup: an environment admits a profile of learning rules with multiple steady states, essentially, if and only if µ l ≤ 1.
A Proof of Theorem 3
The distance between the final population states is bounded as follows (where the second inequality is strict if ν θ (l) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ and l ≥ 2):
The first inequality is proven in Lemma 1. The second inequality (is strict if ν θ (l) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ and l ≥ 2) is implied by the inequality
which is proven in Lemma 4.
Proofs of the various Lemmas used in the Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 1. For each learning environment E and states γ = γ ∈ Γ,
Proof.
where the inequality is due to Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For each social learning environment E, type θ ∈ Θ, and each two states γ = γ ∈ Γ:
Proof. Proof. Case I -Observing different random agents: Eq. (11) is due to the independence of different observations. Eq. (12) is implied by adding to the sum elements that cancel out (i.e., a "telescoping series" in which each new element appears once with a positive sign and once with a negative sign). 9 Eq. (13) is a triangle inequality, and it is strict if l > 1 because the sum inside the " " in (13) includes both positive and negative elements. Eq. (14) holds because each sum adds the probabilities of disjoint and exhausting events. The final inequality is implied by Lemma 5.
Case II -Observing a single random type: Eq. (15) is due to the different observations being independent conditional on the observed type θ. Eq. (16) is implied by adding to the sum elements that cancel out (i.e., a "telescoping series"). Eq. (17) is a triangle inequality, and it is strict if l > 1 because the sum inside the " " in (17) includes both positive and negative elements. Eq. (18) holds because each sum adds the probabilities of disjoint and exhausting events.
Lemma 5. γ −γ 1 ≤ γ − γ 1 for each two states γ = γ ∈ Γ.
Proof. where the various equalities are immediately implied by the definitions on the L 1 -norm andγ, and the inequality is a triangle inequality.
9 We use the convention that a product of an empty set (e.g.,
1≤j<1
) is equal to one.
